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Abstract 
 
This paper puts figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the Journal of 
Development Studies. We investigate the underpinning Somaliland-based hypothesis that foreign 
aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. The assessment is based on 53 
African countries for the period 1996-2010. For more policy options, the dataset is disaggregated 
into fundamental characteristics of African development based on income-levels, legal origins, 
natural resources and landlockeness. While the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, 
low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot conclude on its 
validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. Policy implications, caveats and 
future directions are discussed.  
 
JEL Classification: B20; F35; F50; O10; O55 
Keywords: Foreign Aid; Political Economy; Development; Africa 
 
Acknowledgement  
This paper was funded by the Global Development Network (GDN). The author is highly 
indebted to its Selection Committee for constructive comments (15
th
 GDN Development 
Conference).  
                                                 
1
 Simplice A. Asongu is Lead economist in the Research Department of the AGDI (asongus@afridev.org).  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The Eubank (2012) hypothesis has increased the confidence of the Somaliland 
government and reignited the heated debate on aid and political governance. Recently, 
Somaliland’s minister of energy and minerals (Hussein Abdi Dualeh) openly professed during an 
African mining conference that Somaliland was better without foreign aid and did not even need 
it: “That is a blessing in disguise. Aid never developed anything…Aid is not a panacea, we’d 
rather not have it….How many African countries do you know that developed because of a lot of 
aid? It’s a curse. The ones that get the most aid are the ones with the problems….We’ve been left 
to our own devices. We are our own people and our own guys. We pull ourselves up by our own 
bootstraps. We owe absolutely nothing to anybody. We would not change hands with Greece 
today. We have zero debt” (Stoddard, 2014). Before Eubank, the ‘Bottom Billion’ and ‘Dead 
Aid’ by Collier (2007) and Moyo (2009) respectively had also received tremendous feedbacks 
from policy making and academic circles.  
 Collier has postulated that because most aid-recipient countries are fragile, weak in 
governance, inter alia, aid handled through the Official Development Assistance (ODA) program 
has not had the desired effects. According to this narrative, aid-disbursement mechanisms have 
not been effective because of four main traps: landlocked with bad neighbors, conflicts, 
management & dependence on natural resources, and weak governance in small countries. The 
thesis further sustains that the Bottom billion in poverty are benefiting less on development 
strategies based on adapting ODAs to a certain benchmark of donor Gross National Income 
(GNI). The narrative is also broadly in accordance with the position that foreign aid promotes a 
‘regional public bad’ and there appears to be no ‘regional public good’ effect offsetting the 
‘public bad’ emanating from arms race scenarios in neighboring states (Collier & Hoeffler, 
2007).  
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 Moyo’s ‘Dead Aid’ is another accomplished literature that has reignited polemics on the 
appealing effects of development assistance. Her book which emphasizes that aid has augmented 
dependency, corruption and poverty in Africa has also received many reactions from policy 
makers and scholars. Whereas, her thesis has been partially supported by a plethora of recent 
literature using updated data (Banuri, 2013; Marglin, 2013; Wamboye et al., 2013; Asongu, 
2012a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013; Ghosh, 2013; Krause, 2013; Asongu, 2014a; Titumir & Kamal, 
2013; Monni & Spaventa, 2013), there is also some moderate consensus on the unsoundness of 
some of her positions. Accordingly, the classic questions she addresses (for example, the 
relationship between aid and accountability) and some of her criticisms of the way she uses aid to 
support her arguments (e.g the rate at which the coincidence between low growth rate and high 
flows are juxtaposed for evidence that the former is most likely the origin of the latter). These 
have been used by her opponents and/or defenders of foreign aid.  Whereas this narrative does 
not concern humanitarian and emergency relief assistance, there have been spates of responses 
among which two merit some emphasis. First, Sachs (2009) has argued that foreign aid is 
necessary at the tender stage of development and has presented two emotional anti-theses. (1) In 
his opinion, Moyo does not have the moral values to advocate her position because she was 
awarded scholarships to study at the top world universities (Oxford and Harvard) and latter in life 
thinks it is wrong to give a $10 aid to an African child for an anti-malaria bed net. (2) The book 
substantially fails to consider stark realities of life like, the universal need of help at one point in 
life, in one way or another. Second, Bill Gate (an American business magnate now 
philanthropist) has taken the anti-thesis a stride further by qualifying ‘Dead Aid’ as a ‘promotion 
of evil’. According to him, Moyo’s position is morally repugnant to adopt because she appears 
neither to know what aid is doing nor much about development assistance.  
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 The Eubank (2012) Somaliland-based hypothesis has also been celebrated with the award 
of the best paper from the Journal of Development Studies in 2013. According to him, the 
dependence of the state on local tax revenues provides taxpayers with a substantial leverage to 
demand from government more accountable political institutions and better representation.  This 
thesis has crucial policy relevance in Africa because Somaliland is ineligible for development 
assistance but has relatively less inter-state conflict and more political accountability.  It is 
interesting to note that the hypothesis is based on literature without any empirical assessment. 
Hence, putting some figures to the facts as this paper aims would take the debate to a further 
height and enhance policy guidance on the validity of the hypothesis in the African continent. 
Indeed, the theoretical foundations of the debate are profoundly engrained in the history of 
economic thought. According to the narrative, the hypothesis originated from negotiations 
between autocratic governments who were in need of tax revenues (to survive inter-state wars) 
and citizens who were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater public service 
delivery and more government accountability (Moore, 2008; Eubank, 2012).  
 The principal contribution of this study to the literature is to investigate the Eubank 
Somaliland-based hypothesis in the context of Africa. In essence, we assess the validity of the 
postulation that in the absence of foreign aid, there is a more appealing or positive relationship 
between tax revenues and political governance
2
. The remainder of the paper is organized in the 
following manner. Section 2 discusses the nexuses among aid, institutions and development that 
                                                 
2
 “For years, studies of state formation in early and medieval Europe have argued that the modern, representative 
state emerged as the result of negotiations between autocratic governments in need of tax revenues and citizens who 
were only willing to consent to taxation in exchange for greater government accountability. This article presents 
evidence that similar dynamics shaped the formation of Somaliland’s democratic government. In particular, it shows 
that government dependency on local tax revenues – which resulted from its ineligibility for foreign assistance – 
provided those outside the government with the leverage needed to force the development of inclusive, representative 
and accountable political institutions” (Eubank, 2012, p.1).  
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are relevant to the context of the paper. In Section 3, we discuss the data and outline the 
methodology. Section 4 covers the empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 5.  
 
2. Aid, institutions and development  
 The interesting literature on aid and development in Africa has substantially documented 
poor quality of institutions to be one of the main causes of poverty. Notably, high corruption, 
political instability, the absence of property rights, regulatory environments unfriendly to 
investment, unappealing conditions for contract enforcement, and weak courts (Easterly, 2005). 
According to the narrative, in order for poverty to be mitigated, more advanced countries have to 
promote credible institutions and political governance (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Knack, 2001; 
Alesina & Weder, 2002; Dixit, 2004; Djankov et al., 2005; Jellal & Bouzahzah,  2012; Asongu, 
2012b,2013a; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). The extensive literature on the nexus between aid and 
institutions has centered around three main themes for over half a century. First, many have 
assessed the interesting concern of whether more aid is granted to countries with better 
institutions. Second, the concern of how foreign aid affects the quality of institutions in recipient 
countries. Third, the challenging preoccupation of how aid can be used as an instrument for the 
improvement of institutions in recipient countries.  
 The positioning of the paper on the Eubank hypothesis is consistent with the second 
strand above. As we have already highlighted, much scholarly attention has been devoted to 
investigating how aid affects the quality of institutions essentially because government 
expenditure originating from local taxes is far below foreign aid and the latter: decreases 
government dependence on local tax revenues and, weakens the quality of institutions (Asongu, 
2013a). The latter effect converges with the Eubank hypothesis on political governance. Whereas 
there is already a solid consensus on the appealing relationship between tax dependency and 
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political governance (Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004), the incidence of development assistance on 
the quality of institutions has been subject to intense debate (Brautigam & Knack, 2004; Asongu 
& Jellal, 2013). Hence, by extending the underlying hypothesis, this paper also complements an 
extensive literature that has already documented theoretical and empirical foundations of the 
hypothesis (Morton, 1994; Mahon, 2004; Moore, 2008; Timmons, 2005; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; 
Prichard, 2009). 
 In light of the above, whereas the relation between political governance and revenue 
bargaining has been covered in the literature, to the best of our knowledge the absence of a study 
that has been dedicated to the whole African continent is a sound justification to examine the 
Eubank hypothesis. Many of the studies have partially or fully concluded that development 
assistance should be limited in the continent, so that the Africa should be left to chart its own 
course of development (Morton, 1994; Collier, 2007; Moyo, 2009). The State’s dependence on 
local tax revenues generally leads to better provision of public services and enforcement of 
property rights (Timmons, 2005). This hypothesis on the revenue bargaining in political 
governance has been confirmed in Latin America (Mahon, 2004) and in latter studies on domestic 
institutions (Mahon, 2005). A narrative also verified and broadly validated in Ghana (Prichard, 
2009), China (Bernstein & Lu, 2008) and contemporary developing nations (Moore, 2008).  
 The above scope is consistent with a growing strand of the political economy literature 
suggesting a rethinking of aid-based development models. The Amin (2013) stance on the 
possibility of neocolonial interest at the center of grand aid is in accordance with the position of 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) on Africa’s entrapment in a web of large scale colonial matrices of 
power and Kindiki (2011) on the urgent imperative for Africa to strategically overcome its 
dependence on international wheels of power.  According to Amin, development should not the 
reduced to acceptance or refusal of the Washington consensus or what donors think is good for 
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the African continent. He is joined by Obeng-Odoom (2013) on the position that there is genuine 
need for a holistic process in which real African needs are clearly articulated.  
 Before we dive into the empirical analysis, it is worthwhile to devote some space to 
discussing the highlighted Eubank (2012) hypothesis to elaborate detail. According to the author, 
the theoretical foundations substantially originate from government’s dependence on local tax 
revenues. Hence, the government is obliged to make political concessions in terms of governance 
and accountability in exchange for tax income. The adage of ‘no taxation without representation’ 
clearly justifies this compromise between taxation and political leadership because it procures the 
electorate the leverage of asking for greater political representation and voice & accountability. 
Since the thesis is more relevant in States that lack natural resources, the study would improve 
scholarly understanding of how governments can improve the climate of investment by means of 
credible accountable and representative institutions. The narrative further elucidates that under 
financial stress, the trade-off between taxation and political concessions is the most optimal 
means of collecting tax income. Thus, the hypothesis of Somaliland is a new theoretical 
illustration of the relation between political accountability and tax income in contemporary sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). In summary, verifying the hypothesis improves how much we know 
already about foreign aid as an instrument that disrupts the solidification of representative 
institutions due to poor revenue bargaining (or taxation in exchange for improvements in political 
governance). But, essentially the most appealing justification for investigating the hypothesis is a 
request for further research by Eubank himself. In essence, he has warned that the findings should 
not be construed as relevant to Africa unless they are backed by empirical validity.  
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data 
3.1.1 Dependent, independent and control variables  
We investigate a panel of 53 African countries with data from Development Indicators of 
the World Bank for the period 1996-2010. The focus on Africa is to extend the debate on the 
effect of foreign aid on institutions by Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a, 2013a), Asongu 
& Jellal (2013)
3
. The choice of this periodicity is because political governance indicators are only 
available from the year 1996. The data consists of three year averages in non-overlapping 
intervals (NOI) to mitigate any short-run disturbances
4
. There are at least three advantages to the 
use of data averages: (a) fulfill a primary condition for the employment of a GMM strategy 
(N>T); (b) restrict  over-identification (difference between instruments and endogenous 
explaining variables) or instrument proliferation, such that the number of instruments is less than 
the number of cross-sections and; (c) mitigate potential business cycle disturbances.    
The dependent variable is political governance (voice & accountability and political 
stability). The constituent variables are consistent with the Kaufmann et al. (2010) definition of 
political governance as recently used by Andrés et al. (2013). To these constituent indicators we 
had a composite indicator of political governance that is obtained through principal component 
analysis (PCA) in Section 3.2.1 below.  
Criticisms might arise on the source of World Governance Indicators (WGI) because it 
limits the periodicity from 1996-2010 and consists of data normalized on a yearly basis. Hence, 
other governance related data from other sources (Polity IV, Freedom House, and ICRG 
                                                 
3
 For more insights into the heated debate on the incidence of foreign aid on corruption and/or institutional quality 
please refer to Okada & Samreth (2012), Asongu (2012a, 2013a), Asongu & Jellal (2013).  Accordingly, Asongu 
(2012a) has invalidated the Okada & Samreth (2012) results in Africa. In response to criticisms arising, he has 
further used conditional (Asongu, 2013a) and indirect channels (Asongu & Jellal, 2013) to fully and partially 
confirm his findings respectively.  
4
 We have five-three year NOI: 1996-1998; 1999-2001; 2002-2004; 2005-2007 & 2008-2010.  
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(International Country Risk Guide)) could be presented as an alternative to extend the 
observation period considerably. We address these concerns on three counts. First, as emphasized 
above we have used the World Bank measurement of political governance which consists of 
‘voice & accountability’ and ‘political stability/no violence’. Second, the constraint of short-time 
span is consistent with the adopted empirical GMM estimation strategy (where N is large and T is 
small). Third, to the best of our knowledge, Polity IV and Freedom House indicators are also 
yearly measurements. Moreover the latter set of indicators relatively displays very low 
variability. The conception of the former (Polity IV) has varied with time: while it was designed 
originally as a proxy for the durability of political systems, in later years however, the concept 
has been broadened in analytical scope to incorporate ‘regime type’ concerns.  
 Official Development Assistance (ODA) is the first main independent variable of interest 
(Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu & Jellal, 2013). We use three main ODA indicators for 
robustness purposes, notably: Total Net Official Development Assistance (NODA), NODA from 
Multilateral Donors (MD) and NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
countries. Whereas the first is used in the empirical section, the second and third are employed 
for robustness checks to assess the consistency of results. It is important to note that the form of 
aid investigated here is financial development assistance. Accordingly, making this distinction is 
important for policy orientation (Martinussen, 1997; Degnbol-Martinussen &  Engberg-Pedersen, 
2003). The second main independent variable of interest is the proxy for taxation: Total tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP (Jellal & Asongu, 2013).  
 Consistent with the aid-development literature, we control for press freedom, public 
investment and inflation. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical foundations of the 
investment and fiscal behavior channels have been substantially documented in the aid literature 
(Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 1966; Mosley et al., 1992; Reichel, 1995; Boone, 1996; 
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Gomane et al., 2003; Mosley et al., 2004 ; Larrain & Tavares, 2004; Addison et al., 2005; 
Easterly, 2005; Bird, 2007; Baliamoune-Lutz & Ndikumana, 2008; Morrissey, 2012; Benedek et 
al., 2012; Jellal & Asongu, 2013). Accordingly, theoretical underpinnings of foreign aid sustain 
that it is fundamentally needed to bridge the financial gap (Rostow, 1960; Chenery & Strout, 
1966). Foreign aid is necessary to boost public investment (Easterly, 2005). Asongu & Jellal 
(2003) have used the fiscal behavior and investment mechanisms to assess the effect of foreign 
aid on corruption (Asongu & Jellal, 2013). While we expect press-freedom and public investment 
to increase political governance, high inflation (especially in consumer prices) should have the 
opposite effect. The expected signs of the control variables are broadly consistent with the causes 
of the 2011 Arab Spring (Storck, 2011; Jung, 2011; Thiel, 2012; Khandelwal & Roitman, 2012). 
We also control for the unobserved heterogeneity in terms of time-effects.  
  
3.1.2 Categorization of countries for consistency and robustness checks 
 In order to improve the subtlety of the analysis, the richness of our dataset allows us to 
subdivide the panel into various characteristics that are fundamental to foreign aid: income-
levels, legal origins, natural resources and openness to sea. These characteristics have been 
recently documented as instrumental to foreign aid (Asongu, 2014a). This categorization is in line 
with recent African institutional literature (Weeks, 2012; Asongu, 2014b). 
 First, the intuition for legal origins has foundations in the law literature (La Porta et al., 
1998; La Porta et al., 1999) that has been recently used in the African literature (Asongu, 2014b). 
Classification of this category is in line with La Porta et al. (2008, p. 289). Second, countries that 
are not opened to the sea have lower political governance because there is an institutional price of 
being landlocked (Arvis et al., 2007). Third, there are two justifications for controlling for 
wealth-effects: (1) it is very likely that economic prosperity has an incidence on political 
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governance, especially when the fruits of the prosperity are not evenly distributed and; (2) 
income-levels are instrumental in the quality of governance in Africa (Asongu, 2012b). 
Classification of countries in this category is with the help of the Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD) of the World Bank.  
 Fourth, we use petroleum-exporting countries as the main criterion for the natural 
resource category. In the classification of this category, several concerns arise. (1) The 
qualification of countries in this category may be time-dynamic due to: (a) recent discovery of 
petroleum or; (b) considerable decline in oil exports. (2) There are some countries with similar 
macroeconomic characteristics as petroleum-exporting countries (e.g Botswana). To tackle these 
concerns, we take a minimalistic approach by: (a) including only States for which exports have 
been petroleum-dominated in the sampled countries for more than a decade and; (b) limiting the 
resource-category strictly and exclusively to countries that export petroleum.  
 In the classification of countries above, a country could fall within many categories at the 
same time because no constraints of categorical priority are imposed. Therefore a country may be 
in more than one category as long it has the necessary features that are relevant for being 
identified with the category.  
 The definition of variables, summary statistics (with presentation of countries), 
correlation analysis and categorization of countries are detailed in the appendices: Appendix 1, 
Appendix 2, Appendix 3 and Appendix 4 respectively. From the summary statistics, we can infer 
that plausible estimated relationships could be obtained because of the reasonable degree of 
variation in the indicators. The correlation analysis has two purposes: mitigate concerns of 
multicollinearity and overparametization in the same specification and, confirm the degree of 
substitution between political governance and foreign aid variables. Moreover, the degree of 
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substitution (0.541) between public investment and tax revenue does not pose any substantial 
issue of multicollinearity 
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal component analysis  
 There could be some redundancy in information because of the high degree of correlation 
in voice & accountability and political stability constituting political governance. Therefore the 
study employs Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to mitigate the dimensions of the political 
governance variables. The PCA has been widely employed to reduce a large set of highly 
correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PCs) 
that denote a substantial proportion in the variability of the initial dataset. The criterion used to 
reduce the dimensions of the variables is to retain only PCs with eigenvalues that are greater than 
one or the mean (Kaiser, 1974; Jolliffe, 2002; Asongu, 2013b). In this light, the first PC in Table 
1 below has an eigenvalue of 1.659 and represents about 82% of information from the constituent 
indicators. This first PC is the political governance indicator (Polgov).  
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Political Governance index (Polgov) 
      
Principal  Component Matrix (Loadings) Proportion(s) Cumulative  Eigen Value(s)  
Components     Proportion(s)  
 VA PS    
First P.C 0.707 0.707 0.829 0.829 1.659 
Second P.C -0.707 0.707 0.170 1.000 0.340 
      
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability.  
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique: system GMM  
 There are many appealing sides and one principal setback for using dynamic panel 
estimation in comparison to other cross-country analyses (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008; 
Asongu, 2013b). The main arguments for using dynamic system GMM are that it: (1) mitigates 
the biases of the difference estimator in small samples; (2) does not eliminate cross-country 
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differences and; (3) controls for endogeneity in all regressors. However, the principal downside 
of this approach is the employment of data-averages such that estimated coefficients are 
interpreted as short-run effects and not long-run impacts. Hence, based on this empirical 
underpinning, the Eubank hypothesis is being investigated in the short-run.  
 The two equations below in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the estimation 
procedure.  
titititititititititi PIFATTAPGPG ,,7,6,5,4,3,21,10,                   (1)          
 
)()()()( 1,,41,,31,,22,1,11,,   titititititititititi ATATTTAAPGPGPGPG                     
)()()()()( 1,,11,,71,,61,,5   tititttitititititi PPIIFF                                (2) 
    
 Where ‘t’ represents the period and ‘i’ stands for a country. PG  is Political governance; 
A , Foreign aid; T , Tax revenues; AT , interaction between Foreign aid (A) and Tax revenues 
(T); F , Press freedom; I , Inflation; P , Public investment; i is a country-specific effect;  t  is 
a time-specific constant and;  ti ,  an error term. It should be noted that the conditions for 
employing a GMM estimation strategy are satisfied because we have used three-year NOI: N>T 
(53>5). 
 The procedure consists of jointly estimating the equations in levels with those in first 
difference, hence, exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between error term and the lagged 
endogenous variable. Accordingly, lag levels of the regressors are used as instruments in the 
difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation.  
We give preference to system GMM (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) as 
opposed to difference GMM (Arellano & Bond, 1991) in accordance recent literature (Bond et 
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al., 2001, pp. 3-4; Asongu, 2013c, p. 49)
5
. In specifying the equations, the two-step procedure is 
preferred to the one-step because it controls for heteroscedasticity. In order to validate the 
models; two tests are used as information criteria: the autocorrelation test with a null hypothesis 
on the absence autocorrelation in the residuals and; the Sargan overidentifying restrictions (OIR) 
test with a null hypothesis for the validity of instruments. In a bid to avoid the proliferation of 
instruments in the Sargan OIR test, we ensure that instruments are less than the number of cross-
sections in almost all the regressions. We fail to control for time-effects in certain specifications 
only to void issues of exact multicollinearity and significant autocorrelation tests.  
 With GMM, one would normally expect a deeper lag structure with more than one lag. In 
the context of this paper,   when the lag structure in the GMM specification is increased, while 
the results do not change significantly, the AR(2) test as an information criterion becomes ‘not 
applicable’.  
 
3.2.3 Information criteria for validity of underlying hypothesis  
 Before presenting the results, it is important to discuss the information criteria for the 
validity of underlying hypothesis. Accordingly, the Eubank hypothesis is valid with a substitution 
effect, which we discuss in two strands: the mainstream criteria and insights from Brambor et al. 
(2006). 
 First, on the standard criteria, in accordance with Osabuohien & Efobi (2013, p. 299), a 
negative interaction effect implies a substitution impact. On the other hand, a positive interaction 
effect means that aid and taxation are complementary in improving political governance.  
                                                 
5
 “We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by 
Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998). The system estimator exploits an assumption about the initial 
conditions to obtain moment conditions that remain informative even for persistent series, and it has been shown to 
perform well in simulations. The necessary restrictions on the initial conditions are potentially consistent with 
standard growth frameworks, and appear to be both valid and highly informative in our empirical application. 
Hence we recommend this system GMM estimator for consideration in subsequent empirical growth research”. Bond 
et al.  (2001, pp. 3-4).  
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 Second, Brambor et al. (2006) has provided guidelines on how to avoid some pitfalls in 
mainstream interpretation of interaction variables. We are consistent with some of the criteria by 
incorporating all constitutive variables in some specifications while at the same time controlling 
for concerns of multicollinearity in other specifications. However, while the joint test (Wald) for 
the combined significance of constitutive variables has been consistently provided, the 
interpretation of significance in the marginal effects has not been extended to graphs for the 
following reason. For the graphs to really make sense economically, we need some range of the 
modifying variable (see Footnote 14 of  Brambor et al., 2006).  While the effective number of 
presidential candidates used in Brambor et al. (2006) may vary from 1 to 6 in the real world 
(Figure 3, page 76), the range of foreign aid to GDP may not really apply to the Somaliland based 
hypothesis because the country is receiving zero official development assistance. It should be 
noted that while a graph should logically help in determining the range of the modifying variable 
(foreign aid) for which the interactive marginal effect holds, the motivation of the exposition is 
‘foreign aid versus no foreign aid’, and not  the ‘thresholds of foreign aid for which the Eubank 
hypothesis holds’.  
 It is also worthwhile to highlight contemporary taxation and aid. The effects of taxation 
and foreign aid on the dependent variables are not contemporaneous. This is essentially because 
the specifications consists of regressing the dependent variables in period ‘t’ on independent 
variables of lagged periods. Accordingly, in the system GMM specification, in order to exploit all 
the orthogonality conditions between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term, lagged 
levels of the regressors are employed as instruments in the difference equation and lagged 
differences of the regressors employed as instruments in the level equation.  
 
 
 
17 
 
4. Empirical analysis, discussion and policy implications 
4.1 Presentation of results  
 Table 2 below presents baseline regressions. For each governance variables, while the 
first-two specifications control for multicollinearity, the last specification incorporates the 
Brambor et al. (2006) caution of including all constitutive terms. Based on the results, the 
following could be established. First: foreign aid positively impacts political governance; taxation 
is appealing for political governance; and the interaction between taxation and aid improves 
political governance. Evidence of a complementary effect or absence of a substitution effect 
further implies the Eubank hypothesis is invalid in the baseline regressions, contrary to Asongu 
(2014c)
6
. Second, the models are valid because the null hypotheses of the autocorrelation and 
Sargan OIR are overwhelmingly rejected. The findings are not biased by issues of instrument 
proliferation in the overidentifying restrictions because; the number of instruments is 
substantially lower than the number of cross-sections (countries). Third, the significant control 
variables have the right signs: inflation increases political governance while press freedom has 
the opposite effect. When interpreting the signs of the press-freedom estimated coefficients, it is 
important to note that Freedom House from which the data is sourced reports press freedom 
values in decreasing magnitude. Hence, countries enjoying the highest levels in press freedom 
have the lowest reported values (Andrés & Asongu, 2013, p. 674). A possible reason for inflation 
increasing political governance is because it is relatively stable across samples. For example, the 
median inflation rate without Zimbabwe is 5.43%.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 It is important to note that the current exposition steers clear of Asongu (2014c) in at least four dimensions: use of 
data averages; restriction of identification; extension to fundamental characteristics of African development and 
interpretation of results as short-term effects.  
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Table 2: Baseline regressions (Africa) 
          
 African Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.813*** 0.797*** 1.070*** 0.889*** 0.841*** 0.591*** 0.860*** 0.904*** 0.936*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.294** -0.248 -0.313 -0.133 -0.124 0.539*** -0.205** -0.135* 0.071 
 (0.034) (0.151) (0.271) (0.411) (0.536) (0.009) (0.011) (0.093) (0.917) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004 --- 0.009 0.003** --- 0.0009 0.006*** --- 0.008 
 (0.143)  (0.334) (0.029)  (0.816) (0.000)  (0.459) 
Tax revenues  0.007** 0.006 0.002 -0.0005 -0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.004* 0.004 
 (0.042) (0.151) (0.725) (0.747) (0.476) (0.588) (0.005) (0.061) (0.340) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.0001* -0.0001 
  (0.355) (0.971)  (0.449) (0.801)  (0.078) (0.636) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.001 --- --- -0.014*** --- --- -0.004 
   (0.753)   (0.000)   (0.613) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0002 --- --- -0.0002 --- --- -0.0001 
   (0.813)   (0.550)   (0.875) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.008 --- --- -0.005 --- --- 0.002 
   (0.728)   (0.403)   (0.918) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.448) (0.492) (0.462) (0.428) (0.433) (0.512) (0.278) (0.319) (0.887) 
Sargan OIR  (0.115) (0.104) (0.224) (0.564) (0.172) (0.595) (0.792) (0.692) (0.286) 
Wald (Joint) 106.36*** 93.65*** 458.15*** 491.5*** 266.1*** 1564.4*** 129.0*** 99.19*** 1901.9*** 
Instruments  12 12 18 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  41 41 30 41 41 30 41 41 30 
Observations  151 151 100 151 151 100 151 151 100 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: 
Overidentifying Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The 
significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject 
the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-
values in brackets.  
 
 In Tables 3-4 below, Eubank’s hypothesis is rejected in Low income and English 
common law countries. No decisions are taken for their Middle income and French civil law 
counterparts respectively. Specifications of the models are sound (instruments less than cross-
sections) and the estimated models also robust (null hypotheses of the information criteria 
overwhelmingly rejected). Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
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Table 3: Income levels (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Low Income Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.856*** 0.858*** 0.971*** 0.833*** 0.940*** 0.526*** 0.941*** 1.016*** 0.714*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Constant -0.339*** -0.195* -0.318 -0.159 -0.019 0.364 -0.260** -0.147 0.764 
 (0.000) (0.089) (0.231) (0.435) (0.958) (0.287) (0.017) (0.177) (0.453) 
Aid (NODA) 0.008** --- 0.012 0.004*** --- 0.008 0.009*** --- 0.0009 
 (0.010)  (0.222) (0.000)  (0.474) (0.000)  (0.977) 
Tax revenues  0.007** 0.002 0.008 -0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.002 -0.0006 -0.003 
 (0.031) (0.615) (0.419) (0.760) (0.727) (0.571) (0.716) (0.918) (0.880) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.0002* -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.0003 --- 0.0001*** 0.0002 
  (0.074) (0.816)  (0.679) (0.524)  (0.006) (0.875) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.0008 --- --- -0.015** --- --- -0.013** 
   (0.798)   (0.012)   (0.044) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.0003 --- --- -0.001 
   (0.857)   (0.674)   (0.698) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.002 --- --- -0.003 --- --- -0.005 
   (0.927)   (0.780)   (0.855) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.132) (0.147) (0.996) (0.515) (0.620) (0.777) (0.178) (0.188) (0.895) 
Sargan OIR  (0.620) (0.527) (0.475) (0.793) (0.258) (0.270) (0.836) (0.715) (0.205) 
Wald (Joint) 58.93*** 47.79*** 7119.1*** 133.3*** 36.30*** 305.15*** 127.4*** 119.11*** 360.79*** 
Instruments  12 12 18 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  24 24 20 24 24 20 24 24 20 
Observations  87 87 64 87 87 64 87 87 64 
          
          
 Panel B: Middle Income Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.767*** 0.804*** 1.001* 1.039*** 1.070*** 0.306 0.804*** 0.921*** 0.379 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) (0.000) (0.509) 
Constant -0.096 -0.097 -0.381 -0.103 -0.090 1.184*** -0.064 -0.025 2.902 
 (0.352) (0.122) (0.723) (0.255) (0.250) (0.002) (0.489) (0.926) (0.485) 
Aid (NODA) -0.001 --- 0.034 -0.0003 --- -0.001 0.004 --- -0.140 
 (0.759)  (0.723) (0.896)  (0.974) (0.629)  (0.639) 
Tax revenues  0.005** 0.004* 0.004 0.001** 0.001 0.000 0.004** 0.003 -0.021 
 (0.011) (0.055) (0.718) (0.035) (0.189) (0.999) (0.042) (0.191) (0.611) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 0.000 --- 0.000 0.003 
  (0.984) (0.991)  (0.993) (0.914)  (0.808) (0.582) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.003 --- --- -0.028*** --- --- -0.034 
   (0.795)   (0.000)   (0.345) 
Inflation  --- --- -0.001 --- --- -0.0001 --- --- -0.003* 
   (0.622)   (0.564)   (0.088) 
Public Investment  --- --- --- --- --- 0.005 --- --- 0.023 
      (0.489)   (0.307) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
AR(2) (0.750) (0.752) (0.896) (0.599) (0.592) (0.438) (0.925) (0.822) (0.299) 
Sargan OIR  (0.440) (0.432) (0.870) (0.439) (0.425) (0.980) (0.482) (0.536) (0.806) 
Wald (Joint) 175.84*** 176.70*** na 162.11*** 235.8*** 13693*** 169.02*** 243.70*** 1653.4*** 
Instruments  15 15 15 15 15 16 12 15 16 
Countries  17 17 10 17 17 10 17 17 10 
Observations  64 64 37 64 64 36 64 64 36 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test.  Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
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Table 4: Legal origins (System GMM with Total Aid)  
          
 Panel A: English Common Law 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.755*** 0.759*** 0.679 0.847*** 0.831*** 0.340 0.949*** 0.880*** 0.312 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.398) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.000) (0.000) (0.125) 
Constant -0.276 -0.269* -0.149 -0.118 -0.077 0.674 -0.136 -0.076 1.104** 
 (0.114) (0.089) (0.889) (0.623) (0.718) (0.177) (0.273) (0.583) (0.027) 
Aid (NODA) 0.0004 --- 0.005 0.003** --- 0.017 0.006** --- 0.004 
 (0.865)  (0.925) (0.030)  (0.496) (0.038)  (0.906) 
Tax revenues  0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.0006 -0.001 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.012 
 (0.411) (0.459) (0.968) (0.851) (0.757) (0.310) (0.667) (0.721) (0.394) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0002 --- 0.000 -0.0009 --- 0.0001** -0.001 
  (0.694) (0.939)  (0.438) (0.167)  (0.026) (0.289) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.005 --- --- -0.023***  --- -0.029*** 
   (0.429)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.007 --- --- 0.020*** --- --- 0.035** 
   (0.710)   (0.004)   (0.015) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.058 --- --- 0.007 --- --- 0.072*** 
   (0.459)   (0.347)   (0.000) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
AR(2) (0.144) (0.162) (0.939) (0.340) (0.360) (0.439) (0.586) (0.564) (0.154) 
Sargan OIR  (0.436) (0.470) (0.994) (0.345) (0.264) (0.971) (0.736) (0.820) (0.999) 
Wald (Joint) 118.60*** 90.50*** 509.65*** 78.32*** 81.33*** na 1395*** 320.0*** 1576.7*** 
Instruments  15 15 16 15 15 15 15 15 16 
Countries  13 13 10 13 13 10 13 13 10 
Observations  48 48 36 48 48 36 48 48 36 
          
          
 Panel B: French Civil Law 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.806*** 0.911*** 1.100*** 0.825*** 0.797*** 0.549*** 0.797*** 0.843*** 1.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.395*** -0.161 -0.585** -0.210 -0.167 0.437*** -0.081 0.013 -0.512 
 (0.000) (0.380) (0.050) (0.318) (0.352) (0.006) (0.532) (0.920) (0.443) 
Aid (NODA) 0.007* --- 0.015* 0.003 --- 0.002 0.008* --- 0.026* 
 (0.085)  (0.093) (0.339)  (0.531) (0.073)  (0.055) 
Tax revenues  0.010** 0.008** 0.017*** 0.0005 -0.001 0.0001 0.005** 0.004 0.022*** 
 (0.015) (0.017) (0.000) (0.773) (0.609) (0.967) (0.033) (0.269) (0.000) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.0001 0.000 --- 0.000 -0.0006 
  (0.734) (0.828)  (0.521) (0.740)  (0.677) (0.256) 
Press Freedom --- --- 0.003 --- --- -0.013***  --- 0.001 
   (0.493)   (0.005)   (0.900) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0001 --- --- -0.0001 --- --- 0.0002 
   (0.858)   (0.586)   (0.854) 
Public Investment  --- --- -0.006 --- --- -0.008 --- --- -0.018 
   (0.697)   (0.106)   (0.132) 
          
Times Effects  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(2) (0.260) (0.217) (0.469) (0.722) (0.130) (0.168) (0.210) (0.224) (0.262) 
Sargan OIR  (0.165) (0.116) (0.321) (0.386) (0.382) (0.778) (0.344) (0.285) (0.421) 
Wald (Joint) 48.16*** 27.17*** 477.42*** 86.52*** 153.7*** 957.6*** 84.97*** 190.7*** 708.81*** 
Instruments  12 15 19 15 15 19 15 15 19 
Countries  28 28 20 28 28 20 28 28 20 
Observations  103 103 64 103 103 64 103 103 64 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
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Table 5: Openness to Sea (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Landlocked Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.839** 0.873** 0.566 0.664*** 0.667** 0.411 0.858*** 0.865*** 0.891* 
 (0.039) (0.029) (0.270) (0.000) (0.013) (0.126) (0.000) (0.007) (0.035) 
Constant -0.419** -0.440 0.161 -0.469** -0.428 -0.461 -0.486** -0.296 -0.093 
 (0.049) (0.269) (0.733) (0.042) (0.253) (0.439) (0.020) (0.165) (0.930) 
Aid (NODA) -0.002 --- -0.041 0.006 --- 0.059 0.018 --- 0.0007 
 (0.907)  (0.267) (0.570)  (0.154) (0.397)  (0.986) 
Tax revenues  0.008 0.008 0.001 0.007* 0.005 0.024* 0.012* 0.006 0.001 
 (0.319) (0.567) (0.897) (0.070) (0.430) (0.098) (0.058) (0.579) (0.934) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 0.0009 --- 0.000 -0.001 --- 0.0006 0.0004 
  (0.908) (0.225)  (0.803) (0.168)  (0.261) (0.773) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.007 --- --- -0.017** --- --- -0.003 
   (0.388)   (0.048)   (0.856) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.003 --- --- 0.014 --- --- 0.017 
   (0.626)   (0.156)   (0.219) 
Public Investment  --- --- --- --- --- 0.010 --- --- 0.005 
      (0.651)   (0.915) 
          
Times Effects  Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No 
AR(2) (0.266) (0.190) (0.850) (0.264) (0.377) (0.441) (0.956) (0.917) (0.369) 
Sargan OIR  (0.686) (0.735) (0.999) (0.579) (0.594) (0.869) (0.876) (0.870) (0.934) 
Wald (Joint) 212.61*** 178.16*** 442.18*** 63.37*** 33.31*** 464.41*** 48.27*** 48.01*** 412.90*** 
Instruments  15 15 18 12 15 16 15 15 16 
Countries  11 11 10 11 11 10 11 11 10 
Observations  41 41 35 41 41 35 41 41 35 
          
          
 Panel B: Not Landlocked Countries 
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.737*** 0.734*** 1.063*** 0.920*** 0.918** 0.454*** 0.837*** 0.896*** 0.694*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.009) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.310** -0.252 -0.204 -0.037 -0.020 1.006*** -0.127 -0.061 1.019 
 (0.043) (0.114) (0.518) (0.783) (0.934) (0.000) (0.145) (0.496) (0.128) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004* --- 0.018* 0.003** --- 0.003 0.005*** --- 0.003 
 (0.053)  (0.061) (0.035)  (0.474) (0.000)  (0.809) 
Tax revenues  0.008** 0.007* 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.0004 0.003** 0.002* 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.137) (0.258) (0.413) (0.957) (0.036) (0.077) (0.776) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.0007 --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.0002 
  (0.210) (0.131)  (0.697) (0.580)  (0.126) (0.702) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.002 --- --- -0.022*** --- --- -0.019** 
   (0.697)   (0.000)   (0.049) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0003 --- --- 0.000 --- --- -0.0007 
   (0.738)   (0.915)   (0.552) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.009 --- --- -0.005 --- --- 0.014 
   (0.707)   (0.746)   (0.595) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.739) (0.780) (0.276) (0.271) (0.290) (0.522) (0.320) (0.411) (0.858) 
Sargan OIR  (0.235) (0.203) (0.232) (0.800) (0.447) (0.152) (0.850) (0.791) (0.168) 
Wald (Joint) 33.936*** 25.84*** 196.38*** 402.7*** 537.5*** 1903.1*** 116.1*** 48.44*** 2069.8*** 
Instruments  12 12 19 15 15 18 15 12 18 
Countries  30 30 20 30 30 20 30 30 20 
Observations  110 110 65 110 110 65 110 110 65 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
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Table 6: Resources (System GMM with Total Aid) 
          
 Panel A: Oil Exporting Countries   
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.641*** 0.624*** na 0.633*** 0.604** na 0.661*** 0.652*** na 
 (0.006) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.011)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Constant -0.643 -0.742* na -0.414* -0.404* na -0.373* -0.450** na 
 (0.132) (0.068)  (0.071) (0.058)  (0.081) (0.035)  
Aid (NODA) -0.012 --- --- 0.010 --- --- -0.010 --- --- 
 (0.614)   (0.295)   (0.661)   
Tax revenues  0.014** 0.016** na -0.003 -0.004 na 0.006* 0.007* na 
 (0.041) (0.026)  (0.459) (0.324)  (0.098) (0.070)  
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- -0.0002 na --- 0.0003 na --- -0.0002 na 
  (0.741)   (0.252)   (0.743)  
Press Freedom --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Inflation  --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Public Investment  --- --- na --- --- na --- --- na 
          
Times Effects  No No  No No  No No  
AR(2) (0.106) (0.110)  (0.994) (0.961)  (0.171) (0.177)  
Sargan OIR  (0.977) (0.987)  (0.968) (0.958)  (0.960) (0.967)  
Wald (Joint) 93.53*** 108.06***  33.23*** 30.48***  32.22*** 30.22***  
Instruments  12 12  12 12  12 12  
Countries  7 7  7 7  7 7  
Observations  22 22  22 22  22 22  
          
          
 Panel B: Non-Oil Exporting Countries  
  
 Political Stability (No Violence) Voice & Accountability Political Governance (Polgov) 
    
Initial (-1) 0.737*** 0.734*** 1.083*** 0.920*** 0.918** 0.663*** 0.837*** 0.896*** 1.036*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.310** -0.252 -0.205 -0.037 -0.020 0.286* -0.127 -0.061 -0.236 
 (0.043) (0.114) (0.185) (0.783) (0.934) (0.081) (0.145) (0.496) (0.684) 
Aid (NODA) 0.004* --- 0.010* 0.003** --- 0.005 0.005*** --- 0.013 
 (0.053)  (0.088) (0.035)  (0.315) (0.000)  (0.156) 
Tax revenues  0.008** 0.007* -0.0002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.003** 0.002* 0.0023 
 (0.019) (0.068) (0.932) (0.258) (0.413) (0.127) (0.036) (0.077) (0.502) 
Aid* ‘Tax revenues’ --- 0.000 -0.000 --- 0.000 -0.0001 --- 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.210) (0.859)  (0.697) (0.366)  (0.126) (0.869) 
Press Freedom --- --- -0.001 --- --- -0.011*** --- --- -0.001 
   (0.629)   (0.000)   (0.815) 
Inflation  --- --- 0.0005 --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.0006 
   (0.321)   (0.782)   (0.441) 
Public Investment  --- --- 0.015 --- --- 0.0001 --- --- 0.004 
   (0.371)   (0.988)   (0.832) 
          
Times Effects  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
AR(2) (0.739) (0.780) (0.966) (0.271) (0.290) (0.587) (0.320) (0.411) (0.996) 
Sargan OIR  (0.235) (0.203) (0.600) (0.800) (0.447) (0.563) (0.850) (0.791) (0.320) 
Wald (Joint) 33.93*** 25.84*** 1034.3*** 402.7*** 537.5*** 1346.7*** 116.1*** 48.44*** 1470.7*** 
Instruments  12 12 19 15 15 19 15 12 19 
Countries  30 30 26 30 30 26 30 30 26 
Observations  110 110 88 110 110 88 110 110 88 
          
***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. AR(2): Second Order Autocorrelation test. OIR: Overidentifying 
Restrictions test. Initial (-1): lagged dependent variable. Aid: Net Official Development Assistance. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) 
The significance of estimated coefficients and the Wald statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(2) 
tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. P-values in brackets.  
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 We cannot conclude on the validity of the underlying hypothesis in Tables 5-6 based on 
the adopted information criteria for a substitution effect. Hence, while the Eubank hypothesis is 
invalid in Africa, low-income and English common law countries of the continent, we cannot 
establish its validity for other fundamental characteristics of development. 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results, policy implications, caveats and future directions  
 
 We have consistently noticed that foreign aid improves political governance. But since the 
Eubank hypothesis is invalid in some respects, the positive effect of foreign aid on political 
governance merits some emphasis. Hence, this informs policy that despite the substantially 
documented issues
7
 in donor countries that are currently affecting the flow of aid, its direct 
effects on political governance is appealing. Given that GMM estimates should be interpreted as 
short-term effects because we have used non-overlapping intervals to mitigate short-run 
disturbances that may loom substantially, it is logical to infer that foreign aid improves political 
governance in the short-term. Two implications are note worthy here. First, because the 
periodicity of the study covers the post ‘Berlin wall’ era, it is fairly plausible to find a positive 
aid-governance nexus. Accordingly, Donor objectives of foreign aid radically changed in the 
1990s. In essence, before the fall of the Berlin wall, real politik was the name of the foreign aid 
game because the prime objective of aid was to deter African nations from allying with the Soviet 
Union (Gibson et al., 2014)
8
.  Second, consistent with Asongu (2013a, p. 14) foreign aid directly 
improves voice & accountability because it is an essential condition for its disbursement.  
                                                 
7
 See the following for some of the issues: Lagoutte & Reimat (2012), Contini (2012), Schäfer (2012), Zeddie 
(2013), Chapman (2013), Tamborini (2013)  & Bruno (2013), inter alia.  
8
 “The roots of the Washington consensus that grew in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War quickly changed this 
status quo: in addition to strong external pressure to liberalize, rulers began to face increasing constraints to using 
foreign aid to support their followers. While aid continued to flow, it came increasingly in forms far less amenable to 
patronage politics” (p. 25).  
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 Assessing the Eubank hypothesis has improved the scholarly debates on the aid-
institutions nexus at least in a threefold manner. First, by putting an empirical structure to the 
Eubank literature, we have provided the much needed guidance as to whether the Somaliland-
based findings are relevant across Africa. This is in direct response to a request for further 
research by Eubank who has clearly warned that his findings should not be construed as 
reflecting the overall African context unless they are backed by some empirical evidence. 
Second, we have taken the extant of knowledge on the drivers of accountable and representative 
governments to another platform. Accordingly, the hypothesis of the dependence on tax revenues 
by government as an income channels to political accountability has been scarcely covered in the 
literature (Mahon, 2004; Morton, 1994; Bernstein & Lu, 2008; Moore, 2008; Prichard, 2009). 
Third, the scope of the problem statement has also provided an opportunity of extending a recent 
debate on aid and institutions by Okada & Samreth and Asongu & Jellal that has had a substantial 
influence in policy making and academic circles. The complementary effect of taxation and aid 
would be further increased if development assistance is channeled through investment 
mechanisms and not via government final consumption expenditure (Asongu & Jellal, 2013).  
 The policy recommendations are valid only for political governance and should not be 
extended to economic (government effectiveness & regulation quality) and institutional 
(corruption-control & rule of law) governance without empirical justification. Based on the 
empirical underpinnings, we have only invalidated the Eubank hypothesis in the short-run. 
Hence, a long-term assessment is an interesting future research direction.  Moreover, in the 
appreciation of development assistance, the analysis has failed to distinguish between grants and 
concessional loans. Therefore, it is also worthwhile to assess the dynamics of foreign aid that 
positively interact with tax effort to improve political governance. In addition, we concur with 
one of the referees on the position that, since of most of the data is sourced from the World 
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Development Indicators, which could be noisy with regard to government finance, considering a 
new dataset recently presented by Mansour from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) would 
also be an interesting future research direction.  
It is also interesting to note that we have limited the analysis to the significance of the 
marginal effects given the context of the problem statement. While a range in foreign aid to GDP 
may not apply to Somaliland because the country is receiving no official development assistance, 
the Eubank hypothesis could be modified to assess in what range of the modifying variable 
(foreign aid) the substitution effect for the Eubank hypothesis hold. For the purpose of these 
thresholds of foreign aid,  Brambor et al. (2006) would be substantially instrumental for the 
graphical illustrations. Last but not the least, verifying whether the findings are relevant to other 
developing countries could also provide interesting insights to policy makers.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 This paper has put figures to the facts of Eubank (2012), a recently celebrated paper in the 
Journal of Development Studies. We have investigated the underpinning Somaliland-based 
hypothesis that foreign aid dilutes the positive role of taxation on political governance. While the 
Eubank hypothesis is invalid in baseline Africa, Low-income and English common law countries 
of the continent, we cannot conclude on its validity for other fundamental characteristics of 
development. Policy implications, caveats and future research directions have been discussed. 
This conclusion should not be assumed as an extension of the heated debate on the recognition of 
Somaliland by the international community.  Accordingly, the objective of the paper has simply 
been to assess the empirical validity of a celebrated literature.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables 
   
Variable(s) Definition(s) Source(s) 
   
Political Stability  Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  
the perceptions of the likelihood that the government will  
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and  
violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Voice & Accountability Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the extent  
to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in  
selecting their government and to enjoy freedom of  
expression, freedom of association, and a free media.  
World Bank (WDI)  
   
Political Governance  First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability  
PCA 
   
Tax revenues  Total revenues (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Foreign Aid (NODA) Net Official Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) NODA from DAC Countries (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Tax.Aid  Product of Tax revenues and Foreign Aid World Bank (WDI) 
   
Press Freedom  Press Freedom Quality  Freedom House 
   
Inflation  Consumer Price Inflation (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
   
Public Investment  Gross Public Investment (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI)  
   
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  NODA: Net Official 
Development Assistance. DAC: Development Assistance Committee.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics and presentation of countries 
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
 
 Mean S.D Min Max Obs. 
Political Stability (or No violence) -0.571 0.952 -3.229 1.143 265 
Voice & Accountability  -0.679 0.730 -2.161 1.047 265 
Political Governance (Polgov) -0.016 1.291 -3.204 2.621 264 
Tax revenues  26.746 12.798 3.760 93.633 189 
Foreign Aid (NODA) 10.889 12.029 0.015 102.97 253 
Foreign Aid (NODADAC) 6.278 7.303 -0.003 68.063 253 
Foreign Aid (NODAMD) 4.525 5.083 0.004 33.249 253 
Press Freedom  57.475 19.067 18.000 94.000 235 
Inflation  56.191 575.70 -45.335 8603.3 230 
Public Investment 7.492 4.204 0.000 28.342 229 
      
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
      
Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
Tunisia. Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obs: Observations. NODA: Net Official Development Assistance. 
NODADAC: NODA from the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). MD: Multilateral Donors.  
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Appendix 3: Correlation Analysis 
           
PolSta VA Polgov Taxes NODA DAC MD Press Infl. Pub.I  
1.000 0.682 0.917 0.340 -0.105 -0.106 -0.093 -0.650  -0.098 0.274 PolSta 
 1.000 0.917 0.046 0.028 0.037 0.017 -0.919 -0.109 0.034 VA 
  1.000 0.207 -0.040 -0.036 -0.040 -0.848 -0.114 0.167 Polgov 
   1.000 -0.097 -0.068 -0.139 -0.120 -0.116 0.541 Taxes 
    1.000 0.975 0.946 0.049 -0.023 0.148 NODA 
     1.000 0.854 0.021 -0.011 0.128 DAC 
      1.000 0.078 -0.035 0.144 MD 
       1.000 0.150 -0.095 Press 
        1.000 -0.121 Infl. 
         1.000 Pub. I 
           
PolSta: Political Stability. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political governance. Taxes: tax revenues. NODA: Total Net 
Official Development Assistance (NODA). DAC: NODA from Development Assistance Committee (DAC). MD: NODA from 
Multilateral Donors.  
 
Appendix 4: Categorization of Countries 
Category  Panels Countries Num 
 
 
Income-level 
   
Middle Income  Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Lesotho, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome & 
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tunisia.  
   22 
   
 
Low Income  
Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic 
Republic, Congo Republic, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
31 
    
 
Legal Origins  
English 
Common-law 
Botswana, The Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
    20 
   
 
French Civil-
law  
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Libya, 
Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & 
Principe, Senegal, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
33 
    
 
Resources  
Petroleum 
Exporting 
Algeria, Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, 
Nigeria, Sudan.  
10 
   
 
Non-Petroleum 
Exporting  
 Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, 
Congo Democratic Republic,  Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Egypt, The Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania,  Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, Rwanda, Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.  
 
43 
    
 
Openness to 
Sea 
Landlocked  Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
15 
   
 
Not landlocked 
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, 
Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, The 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Kenya, Liberia, Libya,  Madagascar, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan,  Sao Tomé & Principe, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia. 
 
38 
    
Num: Number of cross sections (countries) 
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